4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

538 did not save them for many were arrested and executed at various times.

It was only natural that the period of the civil war was not conducive to the production of artistic literature. For those who were willing to cooperate, there were many posts open in the government, but the pressure of public affairs distracted them and left them little time for belles-lettres. For others who had less taste for political and public life, the obvious course was to retire to the villages and there meditate and work in silence with scanty hope for the immediate publishing of their works. This was the course largely pursued by Tychyna and Rylsky and their friends, together with many of the Symbolists.

However, during 1917 and 1918 new almanacs and journals put in an appearance and these could hardly fail to express the political struggles, for some of them, as *Mystetstvo* (Art), were definitely leftist in character and others were the product of various groups and schools of writers.

• [626] With the final establishment of Soviet power, the literature lost most of the freedom which it had acquired in the years of struggle. The Communists lost no time in suppressing all the old publications and in establishing their own. These were more or less strictly censored. and it was impossible from the beginning to publish any work which might awaken the suspicions of the new regime.

At the same time in Ukraine, as in the RSFSR, the Communist attitude toward literature was not clearly defined. The new authorities spread over the country a whole chain of Proletkult (Proletarian Art) centres with the idea of a speedy development of a new proletarian art. Yet the experiment was not too successful and, as an outcome of the similar developments in Petrograd and Moscow, these were soon suppressed but not until they had created a taste for writing in many of the younger and often uneducated generation, who were attracted by the slogans and the hopes inspired by the Communists.

This marked a definite break with the past and it was sufficient to eliminate from their commanding positions most of the older

the place of the old bureaucrats. They therefore turned the universities into technical schools of a rather inferior character, unlike the situation in Russia, where despite all the changes there was still preserved the fiction of university teaching and research. It was made clear that the teachers were not supposed to busy themselves with more advanced subjects for these were now the province of the Academy. Still there was a steady stream of young people into its influence and for several years it could well be said that there had never been a time when Ukrainian scholarship was so free and untrammeled. 814 813

The Academy in Kiev was, of course, the highest organ of scientific studies but it was not isolated, for some of the academicians, like Dmytro Bahaly, set up in Kharkiv a Chair of Scientific Research like an institute and Slabchenko did the same in Odesa. The example of these were followed in smaller cities and similar research centres were opened in Poltava, Chernihiv, Nizhin, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets Podilsky, Vinnytsya, Zhytomir, Mykolayiv and Luhansk. 814

In the early years there was a constant effort to establish closer relations with the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the other scholarly institutions in Western Ukraine, and for some years there was an active interchange of views between the scholars of the two sections. Several outstanding Western Ukrainians were elected to membership in the Kiev Academy and the scholars went back and forth across the boundary with considerable freedom and cooperated in the development of Ukrainian studies.

In the field of history and of economics, it was necessary for the scholars[1] to pay some slight attention to the Marxo-Leninist ideas. They could not too openly contradict them but it was usually possible, by the addition of a few official quotations, to speak quite plainly with regard for scientific truth and accuracy. [626] ●

Even these restrictions were far laxer when it came to studies of language and material culture. The All-Ukrainian Archaeological Society and the Society for the Preservation of the Antiquities of Ukraine sent out expeditions to all parts of the country.

1 [of Western Ukraine -- Analyst]

The Scholarly Revival

The development during these years[1] was not only in the humanities but it extended to all fields of science, especially those that had to do with the study of the Ukrainian resources and agriculture. Young geologists, biologists, etc. found convenient opportunities for the use of their talents, and their studies revealed new and often unsuspected potentialities in the country. 815

All this work, which was under the Commissariat of Education, was treated kindly by the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty who were in control of the Commissariat. At times they grumbled that more was not being done in the field and under the principles of Marxo-Leninism, but they did not use their power to suppress or hinder the work. In a sense they looked at it with a certain lack of comprehension and criticism. It is not too much to say that this intellectual and scholarly activity proceeded outside the range of Communist interests and was allowed far more free scope than was possible in the case of the writers or the administration. 815 626

The only answer which the more rigid Communists found was the establishment of a large chain of Marxo-Leninist Institutes which were ostensibly devoted to the study of the philosophy of Communism and to the working out of Communist sciences on the same pattern as those in Moscow. These reflected the actual state of Communist thinking and were really schools for propaganda and not for scientific study in any sense of the word. They were liberally supported and they were frequently able to secure their pick of the more talented and ambitious scholars who were willing to rise through the established channels of Communism, rather than by the more exacting service of true knowledge.

It was not until 1927 that Skrypnyk, with all of his Ukrainian patriotism, hearkened to the Communist protests that there were no Communists in the Academy of Sciences and he insisted that a certain number of prominent Communists should be admitted. It was, of course, done but not without grumbling, for the members of the Academy had been very careful as to the type of man whom they elected and as to his scholarly abilities and reputation. They felt, deservedly, that the addition of these new members would lower the standards of the Academy but there was no way out.

[1] [after establishment of Ukrainian Soviet Republic--Analyst]

815
●626 This was to be the signal for the ending of the old system of relatively free thought. It was the first step in the approaching changes that were to wreak havoc on every form of Ukrainian life and bring to an untimely end the rapidly developing Ukrainian Renaissance.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

626 538 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] [68] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win.

[536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Stalin policies. This was not true of the Ukrainian authors who felt a steadily increasing pressure from the Communist authorities. 626 ● 538

The vast majority of the more mediocre authors who had sought to follow unhesitatingly the party line found it very natural to form themselves into the VUSPP (the All-Ukrainian Society of Proletarian Writers) in 1927. They published a monthly journal, *Hart* and the *Literary Journal,* and to show their real internationalism they supported a Russian proletarian journal, the *Krasnoye Slovo* (the Red Word) and a Jewish paper, *Di Royte Welt.* It was only natural that this group should seek support by applying for membership in the VOAPP (the All-Union Society of Proletarian Writers) which, of course, was completely under the domination of the Russian Section, the RAPP. They thus became the thinking or unthinking agents by which the Russians could direct their blows against Ukrainian literature.

On the other hand, there came during these years a similar concentration of those writers who rejected bourgeois ideas but who still were working to develop a Ukrainian Communism in the true sense of the word. Yet they were forced to shift their positions constantly and hence there came a hectic but yet vital series of publications.

The Futurists who denied the value of the past and worked in experimental efforts were naturally the opponents of Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* and finally, in 1927, they united with some of the other radical groups (in the literary sense) to form the *New Generation* which continually published declarations of policy and of adherence to Communist ideas, but this group also drew upon itself the criticism of the VUSPP because it aimed for the adaptation of literature to the Ukrainian scene.

On the other hand, the *Vaplite* was very soon compelled to disband. It did so voluntarily but the bulk of the abler writers immediately started to publish the *Literaturny Yarmarok* (The Literary Fair) in which, under the guise of apolitical writing, they poured out scarcely veiled criticism of their opponents. This, too, was soon under attack and then it was reorganized as the *Prolitfront* (the Union of Studies of the Proletarian Literary Front). This

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to 638 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs. [186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

[656] A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932. This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

Russian writer of the day but a man who was bitterly anti-Ukrainian and scornful of the national cultures of all the Soviet Republics. His object seems to have been in Ukraine to force the literature to accept the Russian pattern. The new doctrine of socialist realism was promulgated and it was very soon made clear that the destruction of the VUSPP and all the old groups was not a step toward the restoration of freedom for creation but a new move to strengthen, on a somewhat different basis, the government's control over everything that was published. 636 ● 538

It was highly significant for this that at the early meetings of the Ukrainian Section, its organizer, I. Kulyk, appeared in the uniform of a frontier guard of the NKVD as a silent warning to all of those who might be regarded as heretical in any sense. Furthermore Zhdanov as a member of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party, explained the situation. In his keynote speech, he declared:

"Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of human souls. What does that mean? What obligations does it lay upon them? It means first that they must know life, so as to represent it faithfully in artistic works, to represent it not scholastically or in a dead way, not simply as an objective realism but to picture reality in its revolutionary development. In this the truth and historical concreteness of artistic representation must coincide with the tasks of the ideal reworking and development of the working people in the spirit of socialism. This method of artistic literature and of literary criticism are what we call the method of socialist realism."

Whatever might have been the effect of the new organization on Russian literature, which had been handicapped by the domination of the RAPP, its effect on Ukrainian literature could not fail to be disastrous. In effect, it standardized all literature on the Russian model and it indicated that henceforth literature and literary men were to be treated as organs of the Communist Party and of the Moscow regime. It was the definite answer to the efforts of the Ukrainian writers of nearly all the conflicting schools to adapt literature to their own purposes and ideals. It took away from the writers all inspiration and desire to use their talents for their own

626 538 artistic enjoyment and it rendered it possible for the central government to abolish that sense of republican patriotism which had been so marked during the preceding period in all the non-Russian republics.

626 538 178 In place of the ideas of the old Ukrainian life which was being brought to an end by the compulsory collectivization and the establishment of the collective farms, in place of the old visions of the unity of the Ukrainian people and those ideals of a new national life that had dominated Ukrainian literature from the time of Shevchenko, in place of the efforts to establish in Ukrainian literature all those branches of art and culture which were stirring in Western Europe, there was now given to the writers, young and old, the command to celebrate and to glorify the actual process of socialist construction in Ukraine, as elsewhere. By 1934 Kulyk, as the organizer of the Ukrainian section, could write of the definite end of the old bourgeois nationalist sentiment as preached by Yefremiv and of the efforts of Khvylovy to reorient the psychology of Ukrainian literature on that of Europe. In his article on the modern Ukrainian literature in a volume on the *Literature of the Peoples of the USSR* published in 1934, he could pass over in silence, for obvious reasons, all of the great names which had appeared during the preceding ten years and shower his praise upon the young proletarian writers who were willing to follow blindly and, to the best of their ability, the new course.

There were, of course, some of the older and even of the more prominent men who were willing to compromise with the new regime. Among them the outstanding figures were Tychyna and Rylsky. Both of them, after consideration and treatment by the authorities, tried to bend their works to the new ideas but there were many who were unwilling or unable to be untrue to their artistic faith and for them there was not even the choice of silence or writing. They were compelled to conform or vanish and it was not long after the organization of the All-Union Society of Soviet Writers when this was made abundantly clear.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

191 Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
●626 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]
122

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace and after the murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new investigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1932 - Analyst]

661/538 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

●626/538 Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues, some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[Persecution during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyst

old notion that "Mother Ukraine" had the same interest in all her sons, whether they were working men, peasants or intellectual nationalists. Both of them later revised their works under the kind leadership of the Party. 626 ● 538

The proletarian writers and those who were content to write upon the prescribed or recommended themes were in their element. Kyrylenko and Mykytenko wrote glowingly and woodenly about collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks, "the dregs of society." Korniychuk, a young dramatist, presented in his plays all the appropriate Five Year plan subjects and gloried in the defeat of the old in the factories and on the collective farms. Everything in the literary field that glorified the Communist Party and rejected those ideas which had flourished under the preceding regime was applauded and the successful received honors and wealth and Stalin prizes for literary achievement.

The same development or retrogression[1] was to be noted in the more purely scientific fields, especially where they touched studies dealing with the Ukrainian language, history or culture. Skrypnyk had removed some of the more distinguished members of the Academy of Science. Postyshev purged most of their followers and then he went on to reorganize the institution in the Communist way. The Academy was changed into a series of separate institutes, each of which was subject only to a carefully chosen Presidium. 626 814

Then, at the end of 1934 all of those institutes connected with the old Historical Section and which dealt with such subjects as Ukrainian archaeology, history, history of law, Western Ukraine, etc. were abolished. The study of the humanities was practically ended and the old staff was excluded. There were left only institutes of language and material culture to care for the past and all other subjects were handed over to the network of the VUAMLIN, the reorganized and strengthened network of Marxo-Leninist institutes, which could serve as a more reliable means of spreading Communist doctrine in a pseudo-scientific form. They created a new complex of societies as the Society of Marxist Historians, all of which had the avowed purpose of glorifying the regime at the expense of any form of scientific truth.

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 814 191 In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language, under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit and represented part of the broad general movement which had been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
• 626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

½ [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya during these same years the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

[1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 814 661 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 814 191 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 191 626 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism.

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura.

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied.

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.* He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary ooo to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

The libraries were carefully purged of
those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538
during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626
were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors, poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661
Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities. 722

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism. [814]

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future. 722 538 626

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period. [198] [814]

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and 722 814

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which
626 the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad.

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

538 626 665 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814] 538 626 The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

culture of the Ukrainian people. They condemned nationalist 638
praise of Kotlyarevsky for introducing national pride and feeling 626
into his *Eneida,* the first book in the Ukrainian vernacular published in 1798. They accused the writers and scholars of deliberately trying to drive a wedge between the Russian and Ukrainian people and of refusing to see, because of their bourgeois nationalist prejudices, that the great Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth century had always drawn their inspiration and been close to the progressive Russian writers, as Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, and they denied the existence of any Western European influence on Ukrainian literature, since all the influence had come from the Russians. They found influences of Gorky on Lesya Ukrainka and cited as her models Russian works which appeared after her works were in print. All this made no difference, for the Marxo-Leninists were in sole possession of the truth and their word was law.

Stalin had declared that the new Soviet literature and culture was to be Communist in content and national in form but it was very soon realized that even this was to be interpreted in a special sense. Any excessive attention paid by writers to descriptions of the Ukrainian landscape which did not bring a glorification of the new factories was treated as an antiquated sympathy with the old patriarchal Ukraine and its bourgeois nationalism. Any mention of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Kozak past, unless it was connected very definitely with the union and longing of the Kozaks for Muscovite rule, was declared to be treasonable and bourgeois nationalist in essence. Thus, step by step the authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Ukraine limited more and more closely the possibility of describing or singing of any of the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and the historic past, while the Great Russians were given free rein to glorify the past of Russia even under the tsars, for it was there that the seeds of the Communist Party were planted and flourished.

This process of tracking down bourgeois nationalism perhaps reached the limits of its absurdity in 1951 when the Soviet critics discovered dangerous thoughts in the war poem of Volodymyr Sosyura, *Love Ukraine.* It was a graceful, but hardly a great poem.

538 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared,
● 626 and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine, but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with
532 things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travel-
626 ling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations
626 of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

ooo The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bour- 626
geois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration 538
of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content.

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is 191
shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared 626
in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. 814
Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR.

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for [198]
they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people."

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

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191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." [59]

In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5).

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and culture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism."[76] Aside from producing these undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who remained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 48.

[Non-interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst]

668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[79] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 668* [161] The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

[79] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraïni* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30]

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." [34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

6; Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

659 795 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it [626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
● 626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyïv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous deserters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna*, and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably approved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate censorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
626 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
737 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
737 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
636 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Communists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

186 661 538 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the [62] Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 645 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]